

Policy Program  
Paper

**Demographics in Israel's Education  
System: Changes and Transfers  
Between Educational Streams**

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# Demographics in Israel's Education System: Changes and Transfers Between Educational Streams

Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh\*

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## *Abstract*

*This paper discusses the demographic developments that characterized Israel's education system between 2000 and 2015, focusing on transfers between the various educational streams<sup>1</sup> (based on individual tracking of the ideological affiliations of educational institutions that pupils attended over the years). The main findings are as follows:*

*A. During this period, there were changes in the growth patterns of the various educational streams. The growth rates of the Jewish state and state-religious educational streams, which were very slow in the early part of the period (the state educational stream actually contracted), accelerated substantially during the latter five years. By contrast, growth rates of the Arab Israeli and Haredi (Jewish ultra-Orthodox) streams, which were very rapid in the earlier part of the period, slowed significantly and in the Arab Israeli sector growth actually halted.*

*B. Parental choices based on school educational and ideological approaches are very stable during the years that their children spend in the education system – which means that, pupil transfers between educational streams are indicative of exceptional circumstances.*

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<sup>1</sup> Israel's education system is divided by supervisory authority, legal status, sector, and other attributes. In this study all of the transfers between the various supervisory authorities and between schools of different sectors will be referred to as “between stream transfers.”

*C. Although the amount of between stream transfers is small, their direction was observed to be overwhelmingly in the direction of more-religious to less-religious.*

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## *Introduction*

School choice is one of the most important decisions that families make, and the question of what factors influence that decision is of great importance to all education policy makers. The more options that parents and older pupils have, the more significant the issue is, and the wider its repercussions in terms of policy.<sup>2</sup>

The choices facing parents of schoolchildren (and, at older ages, the children themselves) are as follows:

A. Religious ideology: will the child attend a state, state-religious or Haredi school (or in Ministry of Education terminology, which type of supervisory authority)?

B. Social ideology: will the child attend a private, public or semi-private school, and which type? This choice generally relates to the family's socioeconomic characteristics (in Ministry of Education terms, the choice is between "official" schools and "unofficial" schools (the latter comprising "recognized unofficial" and "exempt" schools).<sup>3</sup>

C. Educational considerations: should a framework of a specific educational character be chosen (e.g., a school that focuses on nature or music, an anthroposophic or "democratic" school)?

D. Sector considerations: will the child attend a school in which the other children are members of the same sector, or a mixed-sector school?

These are not one-time decisions; parents (and older pupils) are repeatedly faced with such choices throughout the child's school years. Each choice has social, educational and financial implications for both

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<sup>2</sup> Currently, there is no question of parents not having a choice as to where to send their children. Even if there is only one relevant institution in their area of residence (as in very remote localities), there will still likely be parents who will choose not to send their children to school at all – despite the unlawfulness of such a measure and the risk of legal action or imprisonment. In many other instances, all local schools are ostensibly open to all, but in reality the option of enrolling in them is merely theoretical, as they are too far away, charge excessively high tuition, or accept only pupils from specific populations. The level of parental choice is higher at the post-primary level, but exists at the primary level as well.

<sup>3</sup> There is, of course, yet another option – that of ostensibly public institutions that nevertheless have many private characteristics, such as the regional and official, specialized schools that are operated within the public education system. We will discuss these schools later on.

parents and children, as well as for their immediate environment and for society as a whole. The reasons behind people's choices are many and varied: convenience – the preference for a school that is close to home, where the child will have friends who live nearby; the desire for a framework that matches the parents' ideological, social or religious outlook; or the desire for a school that is in line with the parents' social aspirations (evading integration, search for a framework populated by the majority group, etc.).

Since 2000, there have been major changes in the Jewish education sector. One is a rise in the proportion of Haredim – an increase that was very rapid in the early part of the study period but which decelerated significantly during the later years (Blass, 2014). The second change, which some think is now intensifying, is a growing trend toward preferring elitist educational institutions. These frameworks, whether they are private or ostensibly public (in terms of belonging to the official education system) are, in essence, socioeconomically selective. A third change is an increase in the percentage of Haredi pupils entering frameworks that are not affiliated with one of the two major Haredi networks: Chinuch Atzma'i (identified with the Lithuanian stream) or Ma'ayan HaChinuch HaTorani (the Shas network).

Nor has the Arab Israeli sector been free of change. The most notable development has been a slowdown to the point of cessation, and in some years even decline, in the growth rate of pupil numbers and of the Arab Israeli stream's share in the education system as a whole. At the same time there is evidence of a significant rise in the percentage of Arab Israeli pupils who are enrolling in non-public school systems.

These developments raise important questions about demographic, social and political trends in Israeli society generally, and in the education system specifically. It should be noted that in the not-so-distant past, researchers lacked suitable means of investigating the sources of these changes in the system. Analyses were based on comprehensive pupil-number reports for each framework and on comparisons between successive years. It was impossible, though, to determine whether a particular stream had expanded due to natural increase, pupil transfers between different parts of the system, or other reasons, such as changes in religious or educational outlook. Now, however, the tools available to researchers have improved (see the Investigation Methods section).

In 2006, the first study of transfers between the education system's various streams was published (Blass and Douchan, 2006). The study's

main conclusion was that once a pupil or his/her parents chose an educational stream characterized by a particular ideological, educational or social outlook, the chance that he/she will transfer to an educational institution of a different character is very small. The implication of this finding is that parents consciously and deliberately choose the identity of the educational institutions that their children attend, and that the choices remain stable over time. When the study was replicated, a similar picture emerged (Blass, 2012). The aim of the present study is to determine whether this finding – which was by no means self-evident at the time, and is not today – is still valid, and to expand the investigation beyond the scope of the earlier studies, by increasing the number of years covered and by including the transition from kindergarten-to-primary-school.<sup>4</sup>

The paper will first discuss the demographic changes that have affected the education system since 2000. Afterward we will assess the overall scope of transfers within the system, and then take an in-depth look at the transfer directions and their volumes, and at how transfer trends have developed over the years, breaking them down by study level (age group).

### *Study Methodology*

The study will concentrate specifically on pupil transfers between different supervisory authorities, between public (state schools) and private schools, and between different school networks within the Haredi sector (although it would also be interesting to study the impact of school-to-school transfers in general, due to moving house or graduating from primary to lower secondary school, on the individual and the community). The reason for this specific focus is that issues such as privatization and Haredi education's growing share within the system have been subjects of public debate in recent years, making the scope of these developments and the transfers' contribution to demographic changes in the system topics worthy of in-depth examination.

For purposes of the investigation, pupils identified were those who transferred from one educational institution to another during the study period. From this group, those selected moved from schools of one supervisory authority to another whether the transfer took place while the

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<sup>4</sup> The significant advantage of including the transition from kindergarten to primary school in the investigation is that we can explore the possibility that, at the pre-primary level, parents attach less importance to the institution's ideological affiliation.

pupil was still in the same educational level (pre-primary, primary, middle or high school) or whether it was in the move from one level of education to another. Those pupils who had transferred from official schools to recognized unofficial schools, and vice versa, were identified as well (but only at the primary and lower secondary levels, as most high schools are recognized unofficial).

The data were taken from pupil and institutional files for the years 2000 to 2015 that are available to researchers in the Ministry of Education's virtual research room. These files contain personal information about the pupils (whose identification numbers are encrypted) and data on the educational institutions that they attended. By merging the pupil and institutional files for each year, we can determine which educational institution was attended by each child. The data refer to all children for whom the Ministry has information; for ages 3-4, though, they are incomplete, as some 3- and 4-year-olds do not attend pre-schools that report to the Ministry. Data are also incomplete for Haredi pupils attending yeshivot ketanot after Grade 8.

In addition to the lack of information on a portion of the Haredi pupils at the later educational stages, there are serious problems with the reliability of the existing information. For example, in contrast to everything that is widely known about education systems (in Israel and abroad) that the number of pupils declines from year to year due to drop-outs and factors like death and emigration, in the Haredi community there is actually an increase in the number of pupils from Grades 9 to 11 with a dramatic decline in Grade 12. This is according to the Ministry of Education's official website, B'Mabat Rachav, which has been providing cross-sectional data on pupil numbers since 2000. A meticulous study of this "phenomenon" reveals irregularity in the way the data were recorded, and raises many questions.<sup>5</sup> Despite this, it was decided to also survey high-school level transfers for Haredim, due to the fact that the overall trend for this educational stage was consonant with trends at the earlier educational stages. Moreover, the transfer data seem to be more reliable

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<sup>5</sup> For example, in 2013, over 2,000 pupils who appeared in the Haredi-sector Grade 10 figures did not appear in Grade 9 figures for 2012, while over 1,000 pupils did not appear in the data for the four preceding years. Another data review of Grade 10 in 2014 found over 2,000 pupils who were not registered for Grade 9 in 2013 but hundreds of whom were registered that year for Grade 10 (as though they were repeating the grade) or for Grade 8 (as though they had "skipped" Grade 9).

than the data on total pupil numbers, as they are based on dual reporting – by the institution that the pupil left and the institution to which the pupil switched – and refer only to pupils about whom data exist.<sup>6</sup> Notwithstanding the difficulties at the higher educational levels, we can say that the data are nearly complete for all age groups, from compulsory kindergarten to Grade 9. It should be noted that all of the figures refer to regular education only; pupils in special education are not included.

### ***Changes in the Education System's Demographic Composition: 2000 to 2015***

Transfers between different parts of the education system need to be seen against the background of demographic developments within the system as a whole during the research period. This section will look at the developments that characterized the entire Israeli education system, from pre-primary (ages 3-5) through Grade 12.


Figure 1 shows an interesting phenomenon which was noted in earlier Taub Center publications (Blass, 2010; 2012; 2014) but whose ramifications and implications have yet to be fully accepted, understood or internalized by Israeli education policy makers, let alone by the public at large. That is, over the past 15 years, there have been dramatic change in the growth rates of the various streams within the education system.

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
<sup>6</sup> Due to past problems with double pay-outs, the Ministry of Education now takes greater pains to ensure that two different institutions do not report enrollment of the same pupil at the same time.

Figure 1  
**Pupil distribution by educational stream**

A. Percent



B. Numbers of pupils, thousands




Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.

Data: Ministry of Education.

As we can see from Figure 2, throughout the period the growth rate of state and state-religious education increased, while that of Haredi and Arab Israeli education declined greatly.<sup>7</sup> At the beginning of the period the state stream's mean growth rate was actually zero (in some years it was negative); at the end of the period it had reached 3 percent. State-religious education was growing at a rate of half a percentage point per year at the start of the period, and reached a rate of 3.5 percent per year at its end. By contrast, the growth rate of the Arab Israeli and Haredi educational streams decreased from 6 percent (Arab Israeli) and 7 percent (Haredi) to 2 percent and 3 percent, respectively (though, as noted, there was a dramatic rise in the last year of the research period in the Haredi pupil growth rate, whose cause is as yet unclear).

<sup>7</sup> The 2014-2015 school year deviated slightly from this pattern. Time will tell whether this was a one-time phenomenon or the beginning of a new trend.

Figure 2  
**Annual pupil growth rate in the education system**  
 By sector



Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
 Data: Ministry of Education.

Had growth rates remained what they were at the beginning of the period (2000 to 2003) – a common assumption when making simplistic extrapolation-based forecasts – the number of Jewish state-education pupils would have declined by 132,000, versus the actual situation in 2015. State-religious education would have contracted by 46,000 pupils, the Haredi stream would have added 121,000 pupils, and the number of pupils in the Arab Israeli educational stream would have increased by 244,000 (see Appendix Table 1). In education-system distribution terms, had the average growth rate of the period's first three years remained the same, in 2015, the Arab Israeli educational stream would have accounted for a 34 percent share of all pupils in Israel (versus the actual figure of 25 percent); the Haredi share would have been 23 percent of all pupils (compared with the actual figure of 19 percent), and the Jewish state and state-religious share would have been only 43 percent (versus today's 56 percent).<sup>8</sup> If we look only at Grades 1 through 6 (the "future generation"), we find that, had the 2000-2003 growth rate held steady throughout the period in question,

<sup>8</sup> On the difficulty of predicting demographic developments in the education system, see Blass (2014).

the state educational stream would have contracted by 83,000 pupils, while state-religious education would have lost 25,000 pupils. By contrast, Haredi education would have gained 28,000 pupils, and Arab Israeli education would have grown by 70,000 pupils (Appendix Table 2).

The great changes in demographic composition that characterized the Israeli education system, and especially the rapid growth of the Haredi and Arab Israeli streams that took place during the early part of the period, caused the system's leadership a great deal of concern. In fact, measures were taken to counter the prevailing trends. For instance, parents in the "knitted kippa" or National-religious sector were reported to be sending their children to Haredi schools since cuts in the school hour budgets were preventing gender separation in the state-religious educational stream (Maroz, 2000), and the Tel Aviv Municipality decided to open subsidized preschools for the secular population in the southern part of the city so that there would be alternatives to Haredi preschool frameworks (Yehoshua, 2001). State Comptroller's Report No. 62 (2011) also mentions the prevailing concerns in the state-religious educational stream, even noting that a task force had been created to act on "the desire to protect state education from its constant erosion by recognized unofficial education." Not only did media professionals and politicians find the growth trends in Arab Israeli and Haredi education worrisome, academic researchers also predicted that by the year in which this paper is being written (2016) those two streams would become the majority, or, together, would at least nearly equal the share of state education in Israel's education system.<sup>9</sup>

We are forced to conclude that forecasting pupil numbers is no easy matter, especially when more detailed projections are attempted, including pupil distribution between the different parts of the system. Even the predictions arrived at by trustworthy professionals – who are trained to produce forecasts of these kinds – should be taken with a large grain of salt (including, of course, those presented in this paper).

What caused these exceptional changes in the Israeli pupil population's demographic composition, and why is it so hard to predict demographic developments? This question has a number of possible answers, the most

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<sup>9</sup> See forecasts by the Central Bureau of Statistics (2010) and Ben-David (2009). These forecasts, especially the latter, had a profound impact on public discourse and were widely quoted in the media, for example by Yeshayahu (2010), Peled (2010) and Rolnik (2010).

notable of which are changes in fertility rates, and changes in educational-framework participation rates.

**A. Changes in the rate of natural increase in the population groups.**

Table 1, taken from the Central Bureau of Statistics' most recent statistical abstract (2015) clearly shows a major decline in the total fertility<sup>10</sup> of most of Israel's non-Jewish population groups, and a concomitant rise in Jewish fertility rates over the past 15 years. Fertility in the Jewish population rose 16.5 percent (from 2.67 to 3.11 children per woman), while the Muslim fertility rate declined by 26.7 percent, the Christian fertility rate by 3.4 percent, and the Druze fertility rate by 23.3 percent.

**Table 1. Fertility rates, by religion**

	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010-2014	2013	2014
<b>Jews</b>	2.67	2.81	3.03	3.05	3.11
<b>Muslims</b>	4.57	3.89	3.50	3.35	3.35
<b>Christians</b>	2.35	2.14	2.18	2.13	2.27
<b>Druze</b>	2.87	2.54	2.30	2.21	2.20
<b>Other</b>	1.55	1.53	1.68	1.68	1.72
<b>Total</b>	2.92	2.91	3.04	3.03	3.08

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (2015), Table 3.3 (author's calculations).

In addition to the changes that took place in fertility rate by sector, it is important to look at the way fertility rates changed by level of religious observance. The most recent official figures available appear in a study that focused on the period 1979 to 2009 (Hleihel, 2011). According to the study, the total fertility rate of the Jewish population as a whole rose by 7.8 percent between 2000 and 2009, while the Arab Israeli population's total fertility rate dropped during the same period by 21 percent. The subgroup breakdown by level of religious observance reveals mixed trends: the secular Jewish fertility rate rose by 10 percent; the "traditional" Jewish population showed almost no change; the fertility rate of traditional-religious women declined by 3 percent; religious women's fertility rose by

<sup>10</sup> Fertility is calculated in terms of the mean number of children per woman over the course of her life.

15 percent; and Haredi women's fertility declined by 10 percent.<sup>11</sup> Despite the change, Haredi fertility rates remained much higher than those of the secular population: 6.53 children per woman on average versus 2.07, respectively, (Hleihel, 2011).<sup>12</sup>

These data raise a very important question regarding the Haredi sector: if the sector's birthrate declined by only 10 percent, why did the Haredi educational stream's growth rate drop by 55 percent (from 5.3 percent on average for the first five years of the research period, to 3.4 percent during the last five years (Appendix Figure 2 and Appendix Table 3)? Theoretically this could be explained by large numbers of pupils leaving the Haredi stream for other streams, but as we shall see in the next section, the percentage of transfers between educational streams is very low, and can by no means be the sole explanation for the gap between the birth rate and the annual growth rate decline. The most reasonable possibility that comes to mind – and which has yet to be examined in depth – is that of a process of leaving the Haredi lifestyle. While this document was being written, the media reported several news items (including a major series for Channel 10 television by Avishai Ben-Haim) indicating that the phenomenon has become more widespread in recent years within the Haredi population. However, given that this is not the focus of the present study, we will merely note here that the topic merits in-depth investigation.

The Arab Israeli sector experienced high rates of natural increase during the first part of the period, which explain the rise in this group's share of Israel's total pupil population (alongside a rise in education participation rates, which is explained in the next paragraph). During the second part of the period (from 2010 on) Muslim Arab Israeli women's fertility rates declined.

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<sup>11</sup> The decline is likely related to the 2003 decision to cut back substantially on child allowances, whose share in the livelihood of the average Haredi household is relatively large.

<sup>12</sup> More current findings on this topic that were obtained by the Taub Center in 2016, courtesy of Ahmed Hleihel, indicate that in recent years the Haredi fertility rate has rebounded – meaning that the growth-rate downturn has virtually ceased and the fertility rate has returned more or less to where it was at the beginning of the century.

**B. Change in education participation rates.** The percentage of pupils within each age group varies from age group to age group, and especially from sector to sector. In the Jewish sector, education participation was almost total in 2000 (only for ages 3 and 17 were the rates 80 and 90 percent, respectively), and the situation did not change significantly over the years.<sup>13</sup> By contrast, Arab Israeli preschool participation rates showed significant change, and this unquestionably had an impact on the pupil population's growth rate. In 2000, the preschool participation rate of Arab Israeli 3-year-olds was 33 percent, that of 4-year-olds was 43 percent, and that of 5-year-olds was 79 percent. By 2015, the Arab Israeli sector showed nearly full education participation for all age groups, due in part, to the implementation of the Compulsory Education Law for ages 3-4 in localities that ranked in the lower socioeconomic clusters at the beginning of the research period. Thus the conclusion that a major portion of the preschool growth can be attributed to a rise in education participation rates.

It is worth noting that some argue that growing portions of the Haredi population are attending educational institutions that do not report to the Ministry of Education at all (e.g., Kashti, 2015). However, even if these assessments are correct, the phenomenon does not appear to have the effect of lowering the Jewish pupil population's growth rate, given that Central Bureau of Statistics data indicate nearly-full Jewish primary school participation throughout the period (97-98 percent).

**C. Immigration and emigration.**<sup>14</sup> The period between 2000 and 2015 was not characterized by large waves of immigration as the preceding decade was. On average, 20,000 people immigrated to Israel per year, compared with an annual average of 100,000 new immigrants during the previous decade. When taking into account the fact that some of the immigration was offset by emigrants from Israel, we find that these numbers are insignificant and could have had little demographic impact.

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<sup>13</sup> The fact that foreign workers are not included in the population total for purposes of calculating education participation rates, but are counted in the pupil number data, likely has a certain impact in terms of the state educational stream's population increase, but the phenomenon appears to be negligible.

<sup>14</sup> This section refers to Jews only, as the issue of migration in the Arab Israeli sector has yet to be properly studied. The phenomenon appears to have been larger in scale at the beginning of the 2000s (Blass and Douchan, 2006), and to have declined since then, perhaps due to legal restrictions on family reunification in this sector. The data available at present do not provide a basis for determining whether the impact of Arab Israeli sector migration is positive or negative, but we may assume that it is relatively

## *Transfers Between Educational Streams*

Within the discussion of demographic changes in the education system as a whole, and of transfers between supervisory authorities in particular, the issue of ideologically/religiously-motivated transfers has special importance. This section will try to determine whether the great differences between projected pupil numbers and actual numbers refer mainly to demographic changes and to education participation rates (as discussed in the preceding section), or whether they can also be seen as evidence of changes in parental worldview.<sup>15</sup>

The results of the present investigation support the conclusions of the first study devoted to the topic (Blass and Douchan, 2006). As can be seen in Figure 3 (and in Appendix Table 5), the number of between stream transfers during the study period amounts to 40,000 – 2 percent of the entire Israeli pupil population (and 2.5 to 3 percent of the Jewish pupil population during those years). When calculating “net” transfers (adjusting for pupils who join and leave each stream, Figure 3B), the number of transfers declines even farther: less than 1 percent of all pupils enrolled in school frameworks (and 1.5 percent of the entire Jewish pupil population). This being the case, the impact of transfers on the large fluctuations that characterize pupil numbers in each of the supervisory authorities is marginal; the main explanation for changes in pupil distribution is fertility rates. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine in greater depth the trends relating to transfer pupils – and as will be shown, when we focus on transfers between educational streams at major decision junctures, as in the move from kindergarten to Grade 1 or from Grade 6 and 7, the transfer rates may be highly significant, especially in the Haredi and state-religious sectors.

The data paint a consistent and unequivocal picture in which the “net” balance (i.e., the difference between the number of those who leave and the number of those who join) is higher in the state-educational stream than in the Haredi and state-religious streams (each of them separately and taken together). The transfer balance in the state-religious stream is higher than in the Haredi stream but lower, as noted, than in the state stream. That is,

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
<sup>15</sup> Some transfers probably happen for reasons of convenience or benefit, such as the benefits associated with the Haredi educational institutions. However the assumption is that most transfers reflect changes in worldview on the part of the family or the pupil.

the “net” balance of Haredi education is lower than that of either the state or the state-religious streams.

Figure 3

### A. Number of pupils transferring between educational streams


Thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



Transfers to a **less religious** stream    Transfers to a **more religious** stream

### B. Change in the number of pupils in schools following transfers

Adjusted for those entering and leaving the stream, thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.

Data: Ministry of Education.

When investigating transfers, we should to take into account that in the Haredi stream, especially at the pre-primary level, there are children who are not Haredi, whose parents registered them for Haredi institutions for reasons of convenience. By contrast, few Haredi children are likely to

study in state or state-religious frameworks, which are not suited to the Haredi outlook. Thus, we may assume with a high degree of certainty that the number of children in Haredi education reflects the numerical upper limit of Haredi parents of children of the relevant ages (as there are almost no Haredi children in institutions belonging to other streams, while Haredi institutions may, by contrast, include children who are not Haredi).

### *Transfers at Pre-Primary School Age (3-5)<sup>16</sup>*


The number of children in Israeli preschools during the period between 2000 and 2015 rose from 284,000 to 475,000 – an increase of 67 percent. Most of this rise in enrollment resulted from natural increase but, as noted, it also reflects a rise in preschool participation rates, due mainly to implementation of the (free) Compulsory Education Law for ages 3-4. The increase in pupil numbers subsequent to implementation of the law is especially notable in the Arab Israeli sector and in the Jewish state-educational stream. In the former, most of the impact is attributable to improved access to preschools, thanks to massive construction (since many preschool children in this group belong to the lower socioeconomic clusters, they were already exempt from tuition at the beginning of the research period). In the case of the Jewish population, the difference is attributed to the elimination of tuition, which enabled some parents to transfer their children from private to public preschools, and others to send their children to private preschools whose tuition was reduced (per a government resolution on the issue).

It is difficult to distinguish between trends originating in altered fertility patterns or ideological influences, and trends stemming from higher education participation rates. One way or another, however, we can clearly see the trends noted above regarding the system as a whole: the share of the state and state-religious streams within the entire preschool pupil population declined until 2006, remained stable from 2007 to 2009, and has been rising since 2009. The Haredi stream's share increased significantly until 2007, was stable until 2012 and has dropped since, while the Arab Israeli stream's share rose until 2006 and has declined steadily from then on (Figure 4).

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<sup>16</sup> Because many 3- and 4-year-olds study in private pre-compulsory preschools that are not included in the Ministry of Education system, the data may be less accurate than those for other education stages (K-12).

Figure 4  
**Preschool pupil distribution by educational stream, percent**



Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
 Data: Ministry of Education.


Throughout the period 17,000 pupils transferred from the state-religious stream to the Haredi stream, compared with 26,000 who moved in the opposite direction (Figure 5A). The transfer numbers between the Haredi and state educational streams were even more notable: only 7,000 pupils switched from state education to Haredi education, while 17,000 pupils moved in the opposite direction. Throughout the period, the transfer balance (net transfers) in the state and state-religious streams was positive, while in the Haredi stream it was negative (though the numbers themselves were not large, as can be seen in Figure 5B).

Another interesting point raised by the data is that the number of Arab Israeli pupil transfers from Jewish to Arab Israeli preschools is double that of Arab Israeli pupil transfers from Arab Israeli to Jewish preschools, and that this trend is intensifying (the data are not presented in the diagram). Joint Arab-Jewish preschools appear to pose a substantial number of problems for Arab Israeli pupils. In any case, the numbers themselves are very small.

Figure 5


**A. Number of pupils transferring between educational streams in preschool**

Thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



**B. Change in the number of pupils in the grade level following transfers**

Adjusted for those entering and leaving the stream, thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
Data: Ministry of Education.

### *Transfers in the Move from Compulsory Kindergarten to Grade 1*

A very important – perhaps the most important – stage at which decisions are made about the kind of education that a child will receive is the transition from compulsory kindergarten to Grade 1. As noted, when registering children for preschool the importance that parents attach to the type of supervising authority may be relatively low compared with other considerations such as proximity to the family's home, convenience and the reputation of the specific preschool teacher. But when children move up to Grade 1, parents' religious preferences have greater weight (in many cases parents are expected to adhere to a lifestyle that is compatible with the schools' religious outlook). One of the main criticisms directed at the earlier work on the topic (Blass and Douchan, 2006) was that starting the examination of transfers between different supervisory authorities at the primary school level overlooks the "ideological transition" that secular and religious parents make to Haredi education at the pre-primary level. According to the study's critics, Haredi education personnel employ various means (such as a long school day, bus service and hot meals) to influence parents to send their children to Haredi pre-primary institutions, and those who are accepted into Haredi preschools tend to stay within that stream.

The distribution picture for first-graders throughout the period shows a similar trend to that of kindergarten pupils, that is, a decline in the share of state and state-religious education until 2008, followed by a slow but steady rise. By contrast, there is a rapid rise in the Haredi stream's share until 2012, followed by stability, and a rise in the Arab Israeli stream's share until 2008, followed by decline (for a detailed presentation of pupil distribution by age group, see the appendix figures).

Regarding between stream transfer numbers, this grade level exhibits an interesting and notable phenomenon. When we focus on the percentage of pupils who leave each educational stream (Figure 6),<sup>17</sup> we find that the highest transfer-out rate is from the state-religious education, between 30.6 percent and 25.6 percent. The next-highest transfer-out rate is from Haredi

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
<sup>17</sup> The yearly transfer rate is calculated as the ratio between the number of pupils who leave and the projected number of pupils in the particular grade, were no pupils to leave. For example, between 2000 and 2001 3,243 pupils left the Haredi stream between compulsory kindergarten and Grade 1, and the number of first graders was 13,267; the percentage of those who left was calculated thus: 3,243 divided by (13,267 + 3,243).

education (between 19.6 and 13.7 percent), followed by Jewish state education (between 4.9 and 3.7 percent). When we look at the net transfer rate, we find that state education receives a 6 to 4 percent addition; state-religious education loses 6 percent of its pupils (at varying rates throughout the period); while the Haredi stream went from losing 11 percent of its pupils at the start of the period to losing 6 percent at the period's end.

Figure 6

**Share of pupils transferring educational streams in the move from kindergarten to Grade 1**

As a percent of all pupils in the Jewish education system




Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
Data: Ministry of Education.

As in the case of transfers at all school-age levels, in the transition from kindergarten to Grade 1, the number of pupils who leave the state-religious and Haredi streams is higher than the number of those who leave the state educational stream, and there is a trend toward leaving more-religious frameworks for less-religious ones (Figure 7). The between stream transfer rate was lower in the study period's later years than in its early years, which likely indicates an intensification of commitment to the choice from an early age.

Figure 7


### A. Number of pupils transferring between educational streams in the move from kindergarten to Grade 1

Thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



### B. Change in the number of pupils in the grade level following transfers

Adjusted for those entering and leaving the stream, thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
Data: Ministry of Education.


### *Transfers in the Other Parts of the System*

The trends seen at the kindergarten level and in the transition to Grade 1 over the past five years – that is, the growth of state and state-religious education, the Arab Israeli stream's decline in share and the deceleration of growth in the Haredi educational stream – are also discernible in Grades 1 through 6 (Appendix Figure 2). Transfers in this age range are few: a third of a percent of all pupils in each grade. However, at this educational level as well, the state-education balance is positive throughout the period, while the balance of the state-religious and Haredi streams is negative (except for a single year at the beginning of the period, between 2000 and 2001 – see Figure 8).

Figure 8

#### **A. Number of pupils transferring between educational streams in Grades 1 to 6**


Thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



Transfers to a **less religious** stream    Transfers to a **more religious** stream

#### **B. Change in the number of pupils in the grade level following transfers**

Adjusted for those entering and leaving the stream, thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system




Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
Data: Ministry of Education.

The transition from Grade 6 to Grade 7 is a very important one for some pupils, as it constitutes the progression from primary to middle school.<sup>18</sup> In this instance as well we can see that throughout the period the state-religious and Haredi streams lost pupils in favor of other streams each year, while the state-educational stream received 1,000 to 2,500 transfers from other streams. (See Figure 9. For more information on transfers at the middle school stage, see Appendix Figure 5.)

Figure 9

### A. Number of pupils transferring between educational streams in the move from Grade 6 to Grade 7

Thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system




Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
Data: Ministry of Education.

<sup>18</sup> Haredi pupils studying in eight-year institutions have also been shown to consider this an important transition.

Figure 9

### B. Change in the number of pupils in the grade level following transfers

Adjusted for those entering and leaving the stream, thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
Data: Ministry of Education.

Each year between 11 percent (at the start of the period) and 14 percent (at the end of the period) of pupils in the state-religious stream transferred to the state stream during the transition from Grade 6 to 7. By contrast, pupils from the Haredi stream transferred into the state-religious stream, meaning that, overall, the state-religious stream lost between 6 and 9 percent of its pupils.<sup>19</sup> These changes in the state-religious sector's pupil demographic composition may also have an impact on the stream's educational and ideological character, in the direction of religious radicalization. Haredi education loses 2 to 4 percent of its pupils in the transition from Grade 6 to 7, mainly to the state-religious stream but also to the state stream. By contrast, the percent of pupils who joined the state educational stream after studying in other streams through Grade 6 amounted to 5 percent of all pupils in Grade 7 in the state stream in 2015 – unquestionably a substantial percent.

The number of pupils who switched streams in this age group nearly doubled during the period. The number of pupils who transferred from Haredi education to state-religious education rose from 500 pupils in 2000-

<sup>19</sup> It is highly likely that these transfers are not only on the pupils' initiative. There are quite a few indications – though apparently no research evidence – that state-religious schools persuade their pupils to switch to state schools for a variety of reasons, both academic and religious.

2001 to nearly 1,000 in 2014-2015, while the number of those who switched from the Haredi stream to the state stream rose from fewer than 200 at the beginning of the period to 450 at its end. By contrast, there has been a slight downturn in the number of pupils transferring from state to Haredi education. However, we must take into account that during this period the number of pupils in the Haredi stream nearly doubled, meaning that in relative terms the percent of transfer pupils out of all pupils in the Haredi stream remained the same.


It is also interesting to look at between stream transfer trends during the transition from Grade 8 to Grade 9, as a significant number of institutions in Israel's education system, especially in the Haredi stream and in the recognized unofficial Arab Israeli stream, still have only two educational levels – Grades 1-8 and Grades 9-12. As expected, transfers lessen as pupil age rises, but do not entirely disappear. As with the earlier educational levels, the transitions from Grade 8 to 9 are also characterized by departures from the Haredi educational stream – mainly to the state-religious stream but also to state education; at the same time, fewer pupils transfer from state-religious to Haredi education. Although the state-religious stream receives pupils who have left Haredi education, more pupils leave the latter stream for state education, meaning that the state-religious stream is ultimately left with a negative balance of between stream transfer pupils. The Jewish state-educational stream gains pupils from both the Arab Israeli and the state-religious streams, while the number of those who leave it is lower; thus, over the years it gained 11,000 pupils who had previously been enrolled in other streams, amounting to 2 percent of all pupils moving from Grade 8 to Grade 9 (for the full breakdown of middle school transfers, see Appendix Figure 5).

Another important stage in children's schooling is the transition from middle school to high school – from ninth to tenth grade (this is also a very important stage in four-year institutions(Grades 9-12), as it is generally the time when pupils decide on their study major for bagrut exams in Grade 12). At this stage as well, the transfer trends are very similar to those noted in the younger age groups, that is, continued reinforcement of the Jewish state-educational stream, especially at the expense of the state-religious stream (Figure 10).

Figure 10


**A. Number of pupils transferring between educational streams in the move from Grade 9 to Grade 10**

Thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



**B. Change in the number of pupils in the grade level following transfers**

Adjusted for those entering and leaving the stream, thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
Data: Ministry of Education.

To complete the picture, it should be noted that pupil transfers continue through Grades 10-12 (when pupils' wishes carry more weight). The situation in those grades is similar to that of earlier grades, though the numbers are smaller (only a few hundred pupils transfer at this stage).

### ***Conclusion: Between Stream Transfers in the Education System***

Our in-depth and detailed look at pupil movement between the various streams in the Israeli education system reveals several consistent trends:

A. Pupils generally continue in the stream that they joined at the preschool stage. The number of between stream transfers throughout the period remained stable: only 1 to 2 percent of all pupils.

B. Transfers are more numerous at points where active decisions are required on the part of parents or pupils, for example, between kindergarten and first grade, between primary and middle school, and between middle and high school (from Grade 9 to Grade 10).

C. Throughout the study period (except for a few instances), and at all educational stages, the direction of the transfers was the same. The state-education transfer balance is positive (i.e., more pupils join than leave), compared with both the state-religious and the Haredi streams. By contrast, the state stream's transfer balance relative to the Arab Israeli stream was positive during the period's first half and negative during the second half. The state-religious stream's transfer balance, though negative, was nevertheless positive compared with the Haredi stream (that is, more pupils transfer from Haredi education to state-religious education than vice versa), and remained more or less stable over the years.

In light of the foregoing, we can say that transfers between different parts of the education system have a moderating effect on the growth of the Haredi and Arab Israeli stream shares. Due to the limited extent of the change, we should seek the reason for the strengthening of the Jewish state-educational streams' growth elsewhere, especially in demographic changes: a certain reduction in Haredi fertility rates along with a rise in secular fertility rates and perhaps also, in the Haredi context, a trend toward leaving the religious lifestyle, as noted in Section 1.

## *Transfers from Official to Recognized Unofficial Frameworks*

Another frequently discussed issue is that of Israel's recognized unofficial schools, and in particular the transfers that take place between official and recognized unofficial frameworks. Another name for this issue is "public versus private education." However, it should be emphasized that identifying "recognized unofficial" with "private" is inaccurate, as many recognized unofficial institutions are actually in many ways public schools, primarily in terms of the levels of public funding they receive. For example, the vast majority of Haredi schools are recognized unofficial, and two of the largest Haredi school networks – Chinuch Atzma'i and Ma'ayan HaChinuch HaTorani – are budgeted in a manner similar to that of official institutions. Moreover, most high schools fall into the recognized unofficial category (including the ORT network, the Hebrew Reali School in Haifa, Hebrew University Secondary School in Jerusalem [LeYada], and others), even though they receive state support, and the state determines their curricula and most of their operating conditions.

Despite the many public debates about private education, the number of pupils in Grades 1-6 who study at recognized unofficial schools in the state and state-religious streams is negligible. In 2000, only 0.7 percent of pupils in recognized state education (2,389) were enrolled in unrecognized schools, while the figure for the state-religious stream was 1.5 percent (1,472 pupils). The corresponding data for 2015 were 1.4 percent of pupils in state education (5,162) and 1.0 percent of pupils in state-religious education (1,238). As of 2015, nearly half of pupils in recognized unofficial education in the state stream are enrolled in two specific schools: the Hebrew Reali School in Haifa (2,000 pupils) and Leo Baeck, also in Haifa (400 pupils). The remaining pupils are enrolled in a limited number of small schools.

Due to the phenomenon's limited scope, the only point worth discussing in this context is that the number of pupils in the state stream who attend recognized unofficial institutions appears to have increased over time, while in the state-religious stream the numbers are small. Apparently, though, the reason for this decline in the state-religious stream is that some schools that prior to 2012 fell into the recognized unofficial category have since joined the official framework, following various arrangements.

There are many advantages – especially budgetary ones – to affiliation with the official system so long as the schools uniqueness is not compromised. The state-religious education framework as a whole also benefits from this (at least in the short term, and if we disregard potential harm to other schools) in that it keeps socioeconomically and religiously strong pupil populations from leaving the official system. The leadership of the state-religious stream has an interest in keeping prestigious schools that may have left the system due to parental demands within the system. This kind of response to parental pressure manifests in the establishment of schools that are geographically close but different in character, and causes schools to be differentiated in socioeconomic terms.

The picture is very different in the Arab Israeli educational stream, where the number of pupils in primary schools that are recognized unofficial increased nearly three-fold during the period: from 12,000 pupils in 2000 to 31,000 in 2015 – i.e., an increase from 7.2 percent of all pupils in this age group to 13.7 percent. It has already been noted in the past that this phenomenon appears to reflect increased robustness of the Arab Israeli middle class, as well as great dissatisfaction with the official Arab Israeli education system (Blass, 2010; 2014).

Alongside the increase in the number of pupils in recognized unofficial institutions, there has been an interesting change in the direction of transfers between the two frameworks: between 2000 and 2007, the number of those who switched from official to recognized unofficial schools was higher than those who moved in the opposite direction (222 pupils versus 192 pupils, respectively), but since 2008, the number of pupils who transferred from recognized schools to official schools has been higher (551 pupils switched from official to recognized, versus 1,196 pupils who transferred from recognized to official). We can only assume that the financial burden involved in keeping children in recognized institutions is too high for some families.

### *Haredi Education*

As noted, all pupils in the Haredi stream study in recognized unofficial institutions, but this stream is also split into four main subgroups:<sup>20</sup> the

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<sup>20</sup> Actually there is a fifth group, whose size is presently unknown, that includes pupils studying in institutions that have received no governmental recognition and also receive no budgetary assistance. The Jerusalem Municipality lists 10,000 such pupils (Kashti, 2015), and from a national perspective the numbers could be even larger. These institutions are not even subject to the Supervision

Chinuch Atzma'i network, which is the oldest of the networks and is affiliated with the Ashkenazi Haredi political parties; the Ma'ayan HaChinuch HaTorani network, which is affiliated with the Shas movement; recognized unofficial institutions that do not belong to either of the aforementioned networks; and exempt institutions (institutions that are exempt from the Compulsory Education Law – generally the most extreme Haredi institutions, whose pupils study in “heder” and Talmud Torah frameworks). Most Haredi institutions fall into the public school category if we look at how they are funded, but if we look at their pupil admission policies, curricula, teacher employment practices, and manner of collecting payment from parents, they behave to a great extent like private schools (with some variation from institution to institution).

The total number of Haredi pupils grew, both in recognized unofficial institutions (from 64,000 in 2000 to 125,000 in 2015), and in exempt institutions (from 26,000 to 40,000, respectively), but in relative terms the share of pupils in the exempt institutions declined from 29 percent to 24 percent. The volume of transfers between the various frameworks was not large: between 500 and 1,000 pupils. Generally, there were slightly more transfers from exempt to recognized unofficial institutions than vice versa.

## *Conclusion*

Since Israel's founding, the country's education system has undergone major changes in its demographic composition. These changes included a substantial increase in the percent of Haredi and Arab Israeli pupils within the total pupil population. However, the present study shows that recent years have witnessed a certain change in trend, characterized by an increase in the share of the Jewish state-educational stream within the system as a whole.

The study sought to assess the extent of between stream transfers in the education system, and to determine whether transfers play a role in the changing pupil distribution. The findings indicate that the answer is negative. Parents usually send their children to institutions that reflect their

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of Schools Law (meaning that they are not legal), and are operated in substandard sanitation, hygiene and safety conditions – and no one knows what is studied in them. Nevertheless, as noted in Section 1, the numbers seem to be greatly exaggerated, given Central Bureau of Statistics data attesting to the fact that the vast majority of primary school children (98 percent) study within the Education Ministry's “reported” system.

values even in the early stages of schooling, and the chances are high that a child who begins his/her school career in a kindergarten of a certain character will complete his/her compulsory education in a school of an ideologically and educationally similar character. Most transfers take place when children progress from compulsory kindergarten to first grade, and afterwards during the transition from primary to middle school. In general, transfers decline as grade levels rise. Parents and their older children seem to attach greater importance to home-school compatibility in terms of lifestyle and worldview than they do to issues of convenience that might conceivably attract them to schools whose outlook differs from the prevailing one at home.

At the same time, the data indicate that, of the pupils who transfer from one educational stream to another, the overall direction is from more-religious institutions to less-religious ones. Many more pupils switch from Haredi to state-religious schools than vice versa, and from state-religious to state schools than the opposite. This trend was stable and consistent throughout the 15-year study period. Thus, the state stream was found to be the only one that enjoyed a positive transfer balance over all the research years – that is, there were many more pupils who switched to the state stream from other streams than there were pupils who transferred from it to other streams. These data, and the fact that the decline in Haredi fertility rates between 2000 and 2009 was smaller than the decline in the Haredi educational stream's growth rate, arouse speculation regarding trends toward leaving the Haredi lifestyle.

Another finding that came to light in the course of tracking pupil transfers was a lack of change in the extent of transfers between official institutions and recognized unofficial institutions, both in the various Jewish-sector subgroups and in the Arab Israeli sector (this despite a very large increase in the number of pupils attending recognized unofficial institutions in the Arab Israeli sector). In the Haredi educational stream there was a change in power relations during the period studied: the two large recognized unofficial networks (Chinuch Atzma'i and Ma'ayan HaChinuch HaTorani) grew at the expense of institutions unaffiliated with either network. Transfers between the two networks, and between the networks and recognized schools unaffiliated with them, are few, and tend generally to favor Chinuch Atzma'i).

*Appendix<sup>21</sup>*Appendix Table 1. **Pupil distribution if growth rate had remained as in 2000-2003**

Years	State (Jewish)	State-religious	Haredi	Arab Israeli	Total
2000	801,201	236,793	210,993	330,212	1,579,199
2001	798,797	237,977	224,075	349,695	1,610,543
2002	796,401	239,167	237,967	370,326	1,643,862
2003	794,012	240,363	252,721	392,176	1,679,271
2004	791,630	241,564	268,390	415,314	1,716,898
2005	789,255	242,772	285,030	439,818	1,756,875
2006	786,887	243,986	302,702	465,767	1,799,342
2007	784,526	245,206	321,469	493,247	1,844,449
2008	732,173	246,432	341,401	522,349	1,892,354
2009	779,826	247,664	362,567	553,167	1,943,225
2010	777,487	248,903	385,047	585,804	1,997,240
2011	775,154	250,147	408,919	620,367	2,054,588
2012	772,829	251,398	434,272	656,968	2,115,467
2013	770,510	252,644	461,197	695,729	2,180,092
2014	678,199	253,918	489,792	736,777	2,248,686
2015	765,894	255,188	520,159	780,247	2,321,488
<b>% of total in the system</b>	33%	11%	22%	34%	100%

<sup>21</sup> The source for all of the appendix tables is Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center, according to Ministry of Education data.

Appendix Table 2. **Pupil distribution for Grades 1 to 6 if the growth rate had remained as in 2000-2003**

Years	State (Jewish)	State-religious	Haredi	Arab Israeli
2000	322,391	99,197	90,061	163,540
2001	319,410	99,300	94,856	170,199
2002	316,457	99,403	99,905	177,129
2003	313,530	99,506	105,224	184,342
2004	310,631	99,609	11,0826	191,848
2005	307,759	99,713	116,726	199,660
2006	304,913	99,816	122,940	207,789
2007	302,094	99,920	129,484	216,250
2008	299,301	100,024	136,378	225,056
2009	296,533	100,127	143,638	234,219
2010	293,791	100,231	151,285	243,757
2011	291,075	100,335	159,339	253,682
2012	288,383	100,440	167,821	264,011
2013	285,717	100,544	176,755	274,762
2014	283,075	100,648	186,165	285,949
2015	280,457	100,753	196,076	297,593

Appendix Table 3. **Annual growth rate by educational stream**

Years	State (Jewish)	State-religious	Haredi	Arab Israeli	Total
2000-2001	1.003	1.006	1.067	1.067	1.026
2001-2002	0.997	1.004	1.068	1.049	1.019
2002-2003	0.990	1.003	1.052	1.059	1.016
2003-2004	0.994	1.010	1.045	1.044	1.016
2004-2005	0.982	0.993	1.035	1.027	1.002
2005-2006	1.000	1.018	1.057	1.049	1.024
2006-2007	1.000	1.018	1.046	1.032	1.019
2007-2008	1.000	1.015	1.029	1.026	1.013
2008-2009	1.012	1.016	1.039	1.027	1.021
2009-2010	1.012	1.019	1.041	1.021	1.020
2010-2011	1.013	1.015	1.038	1.012	1.018
2011-2012	1.017	1.026	1.042	1.018	1.023
2012-2013	1.039	1.034	1.023	1.027	1.032
2013-2014	1.026	1.028	1.08	1.013	1.022
2014-2015	1.031	1.035	1.051	1.023	1.033

**Appendix Table 4. Annual rate of change in the number of pupils in Grades 1 to 6, by educational stream**

Years	State (Jewish)	State-religious	Haredi	Arab Israeli
2000-2001	0.99	1.00	1.06	1.04
2001-2002	0.99	1.00	1.05	1.04
2002-2003	0.99	1.00	1.05	1.04
2003-2004	1.00	1.01	1.04	1.04
2004-2005	0.99	1.01	1.04	1.02
2005-2006	1.00	1.02	1.04	1.03
2006-2007	1.01	1.03	1.06	1.04
2007-2008	1.00	1.01	1.04	1.02
2008-2009	1.01	1.02	1.05	1.03
2009-2010	1.02	1.02	1.06	1.02
2010-2011	1.01	1.01	1.05	1.01
2011-2012	1.02	1.02	1.05	1.01
2012-2013	1.02	1.02	1.01	0.99
2013-2014	1.03	1.02	1.02	0.99
2014-2015	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.00

**Appendix Table 5. Net transfers between educational streams  
Adjusted for those entering and leaving the stream**

Years	State (Jewish)	State-religious	Haredi <sup>22</sup>	Arab Israeli
2000-2001	6,581	-3,926	-2,584	-71
2001-2002	7,351	-3,787	-3,522	-42
2002-2003	7,586	-3,122	-4,342	-122
2003-2004	9,753	-2,838	-6,453	-462
2004-2005	7,687	-2,862	-4,786	-39
2005-2006	8,973	-2,987	-5,748	-238
2006-2007	9,347	-2,593	-6,698	-56
2007-2008	8,970	-2,345	-6,676	51
2008-2009	9,857	-2,664	-7,031	-162
2009-2010	9,166	-2,668	-6,554	56
2010-2011	8,149	-2,717	-5,360	-72
2011-2012	8,221	-2,292	-6,002	73
2012-2013	8,587	-2,694	-6,299	336
2013-2014	8,714	-2,328	-6,667	281
2014-2015	8,895	-3,404	-5,819	328

<sup>22</sup> Making no distinctions between supervisory authorities within the Haredi stream.

**Appendix Table 6. Number of pupils in the entire education system from kindergarten to Grade 12, by educational stream**


<b>Years</b>	<b>State (Jewish)</b>	<b>State-religious</b>	<b>Haredi</b>	<b>Arab Israeli</b>	<b>Total</b>
2000	801,201	236,793	210,993	330,212	1,579,199
2001	803,880	238,304	225,068	352,397	1,619,649
2002	801,663	239,273	240,267	369,792	1,650,995
2003	793,505	240,103	252,725	391,787	1,678,120
2004	788,406	242,496	264,204	409,031	1,704,137
2005	773,868	240,810	273,563	419,920	1,708,161
2006	773,920	245,170	289,260	440,489	1,748,839
2007	774,235	249,648	302,558	454,802	1,781,253
2008	773,859	253,370	311,273	466,655	1,805,157
2009	782,861	257,366	323,561	479,476	1,843,264
2010	792,564	262,230	336,818	488,989	1,880,601
2011	803,095	266,254	349,460	494,916	1,913,725
2012	816,912	273,261	364,132	503,637	1,957,942
2013	848,979	282,633	372,438	517,243	2,021,293
2014	871,073	290,620	379,201	524,121	2,065,015
2015	898,067	300,883	398,641	535,979	2,133,580
<b>% of total in the system</b>	42%	14%	19%	25%	100%

Appendix Table 7. Number of pupils in Grades 1 to 6, by educational stream

Years	State (Jewish)	State-religious	Haredi	Arab Israeli	Total
2000	322,391	99,187	90,061	163,540	675,189
2001	320,192	99,162	95,429	170,704	685,487
2002	316,785	99,396	100,195	177,688	694,064
2003	313,529	99,506	105,221	184,340	702,596
2004	313,560	100,831	109,565	190,836	714,792
2005	311,707	101,400	113,784	195,467	722,367
2006	312,766	103,468	118,413	201,558	736,205
2007	316,079	106,084	125,058	210,523	757,744
2008	317,115	107,179	129,772	215,182	769,248
2009	319,437	109,232	135,684	221,682	786,035
2010	325,057	111,621	143,624	227,122	807,424
2011	329,649	113,044	150,263	228,435	821,391
2012	336,266	115,807	157,994	231,482	841,549
2013	341,720	118,367	159,084	229,548	848,719
2014	350,514	121,264	161,772	227,579	861,129
2015	363,490	125,715	167,637	227,691	884,533


Appendix Figure 1

**Distribution of pupils in Grade 1 by educational stream, percent**




Appendix Figure 2

**Distribution of pupils in Grades 1-6 by educational stream, percent**



Appendix Figure 3


**Distribution of pupils in Grades 7-9 by educational stream, percent**



Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
Data: Ministry of Education.

Appendix Figure 4


**Distribution of pupils in Grades 10-12 by educational stream, percent**



Appendix Figure 5

**A. Number of pupils transferring between educational streams in Grades 7 to 9**

Thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system




Transfers to a **less religious** stream    Transfers to a **more religious** stream

Appendix Figure 5

**B. Change in the number of pupils in Grades 7 to 9**

Adjusted for those entering and leaving the stream, thousands of pupils in the Jewish education system



Source: Nachum Blass and Haim Bleikh, Taub Center.  
Data: Ministry of Education.

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